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In recent years, a growing number of researchers have proposed that analogy is a core component of human
cognition. According to the dominant theoretical viewpoint, analogical reasoning requires a specific suite
of cognitive machinery, including explicitly coded symbolic representations and a mapping or binding
mechanism that operates over these representations. Here we offer an alternative approach: we find that
analogical inference can emerge naturally and spontaneously from a relatively simple, error-driven learning
mechanism without the need to posit any additional analogy-specific machinery. The results also parallel
findings from the developmental literature on analogy, demonstrating a shift from an initial reliance on
surface feature similarity to the use of relational similarity later in training. Variants of the model allow
us to consider and rule out alternative accounts of its performance. We conclude by discussing how these
findings can potentially refine our understanding of the processes that are required to perform analogical
inference.
Keywords: analogy; inference; relational reasoning; development; connectionism; neural network
1. Introduction
In the past three decades, there has been a growing appreciation for the view that analogy lies at the
core of human cognition (Gentner, 1983, 2010b; Hofstadter, 2001; Holyoak, Gentner, & Kokinov,
2001; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Leech, Mareschal, & Cooper, 2008; Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli,
2008). Proponents of this view argue that it is our capacity to understand, produce, and reason
with analogies (and metaphors) that allows us to create the wonderfully rich and sophisticated
intellectual and cultural worlds we inhabit. For example, analogical reasoning can drive learning
and cognitive development (Carey, 2009; Gentner, 2010a), facilitate abstract problem-solving
and creative thinking (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Holyoak & Thagard, 1996; Welling, 2007), and
even play a foundational role in the scientific enterprise itself (Brown, 2003; Dunbar, 1995, 1997;
Nersessian, 1992). For all these tasks, it is crucial to be able to draw an analogy between a source
and target domain based on shared relational structure (e.g. solar systems and atoms both consist
of a larger central object orbited by smaller satellite objects), rather than (or in the face of) shared
surface features alone (e.g. tangerines and suns are both round and orange; Gentner, 1983).
In light of the varied, powerful ways in which analogy can contribute to human cognitive
achievement, a great deal of theoretical, computational, and empirical work has been carried out
in an attempt to understand the nature and structure of analogical reasoning and the cognitive
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mechanisms that support it (for review, see French, 2002; Gentner & Forbus, 2011). The most
common and most influential approach has been to decompose analogy into several sub-processes
and to explore how these component processes operate together in analogical reasoning and
inference. In a recent review, Gentner and Forbus (2011) describe four major sub-processes of
analogy:1
(1) Retrieval: Given a situation, find an analog that is similar to it.
(2) Mapping: Given two situations, align them structurally to produce a set of correspondences
that indicate ‘what goes with what’, candidate inferences that follow from the analogy, and
a structural evaluation score which provides a numerical measure of how well the base and
target align.
(3) Abstraction: The results of comparison may be stored as an abstraction, producing a schema
or other rule-like structure.
(4) Rerepresentation: Given a partial match, people may alter one or both analogs to improve the
match.
(Gentner & Forbus, 2011, p. 267)
This type of functional decomposition has inspired a great deal of behavioural research on
analogical reasoning and has significantly increased our understanding of this complex cognitive
process. For instance, researchers have been able to isolate some of the individual characteristics
of each of these sub-processes in human analogical processing. Retrieving analogical matches
from memory is largely driven by surface feature commonalities, while mapping is largely driven
by relational commonalities (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995). These insights have helped psy-
chologists explain, among other things, when and why analogy may or may not be effectively
deployed in problem-solving (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000; Chen, 1996; Holyoak & Koh, 1987).
This divide-and-conquer approach has also furthered our understanding of analogical process-
ing through its influence on computational models of analogy. The models that have been among
the most popular and successful at simulating behavioural data in recent years – models like
the Structure-Mapping Engine (SME; Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989) and Learning and
Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003) – explicitly
implement at least some of the key individual sub-processes outlined above as distinct systems
that come together to give rise to analogical reasoning. In particular, these models of analogy share
a basic commitment to treating questions of conceptual representation and mapping as separate
issues. In both SME and LISA, this is achieved by constructing structured symbolic (or hybrid)
conceptual representations (e.g. of objects and relations) and implementing a distinct mecha-
nism dedicated to mapping (and/or binding) that operates over these representations (Gentner &
Forbus, 2011; but see Leech et al., 2008).
The success that these models have had at simulating a wide range of behavioural findings
suggests that they may capture certain important features of human analogical processing (Gentner
& Forbus, 2011; Hummel & Holyoak, 2005). Indeed, this success has led some researchers to argue
that the algorithmic processes which allow these models to exhibit analogical behaviour, namely
structured representations and explicit mapping mechanisms, are necessary for any system to carry
out analogical reasoning (Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008; Gentner & Markman, 1993;
Hummel, 2010). Hummel (2010), for instance, argues that ‘symbol systems permit qualitatively
different kinds of processing (such as learning and inference) than do nonsymbolic systems
(a difference so profound that our symbolic species dominates the planet, whereas our nonsymbolic
cousins do not)’ (p. 961). We refer to this perspective as the Structural approach to analogy.
The Structural approach constitutes an a priori constraint on any theory or model of analogy
and implies that there are classes of models (and cognitive systems) that cannot in principle






























and a mapping mechanism). In particular, models that rely on low-level associative learning
mechanisms and fully distributed representations to simulate cognitive processing, like many
connectionist models (e.g. Rogers & McClelland, 2008), are thought to be incapable of supporting
fully analogical capabilities (Holyoak & Hummel, 2008; Hummel, 2011; Kemp & Tenenbaum,
2008; Marcus, 2001; Marcus & Keil, 2008; Opfer & Doumas, 2008). A common view states that
while non-symbolic models ‘excel at learning complex correlations between features, they fail
to represent abstract operations over variables, structured representations, and contrasts between
individuals and kinds; and it is not clear how well they can do any of these things in principle’
(Marcus & Keil, 2008, p. 722). Further, it has been argued that because these types of models do not
represent relations and relation-filler bindings explicitly, they ‘cannot use relational information
to drive inference’ (Opfer & Doumas, 2008, p. 723). Some theorists have gone so far as to
suggest that the attempt to capture higher level cognitive abilities such as analogy in these sorts of
models involves ‘suck[ing] the essence out, then force-fit[ting] what’s left into an associationist
straitjacket’ (Holyoak & Hummel, 2008, p. 389).
To summarise, then, the Structural approach embodies two related hypotheses: (1) that the sub-
components of analogy outlined above, especially a specific mapping mechanism that operates
over structured representations, are necessary for analogical processing and (2) that models of a
certain class (i.e. in which these components are not explicitly built in, or in which distributed rep-
resentations and low-level learning mechanisms carry the burden of processing) cannot in principle
come to instantiate these processes and therefore cannot implement analogical processing.
However, some models of the sort implicated in hypothesis (2) are known to exhibit com-
plex emergent behaviour (Elman, 1990; Rogers & McClelland, 2008; St. John, 1992; Thelen
& Smith, 1998). It is not always obvious what high-level functions such models can imple-
ment (or approximate) through the operation of low-level, general learning mechanisms over the
course of development (Chalmers, French, & Hofstadter, 1992). Many researchers regard this as
a key strength of these models, insofar as this allows for a more direct comparison and connection
between what we know about the structure and function of the nervous system and the emergence of
complex cognitive functions over the course of development (see, for instance, Elman et al., 1996;
Spencer, Thomas, & McClelland, 2009). Therefore, we view it as an empirical rather than a logical
question whether analogical processes can in fact emerge over the course of learning in one of these
models. We refer to attempts to capture analogy in these sorts of models as the Emergent approach.
Critically, the Emergent framework denies that analogical reasoning is supported by sym-
bolic conceptual representations and a distinct mapping or binding mechanism that operates over
these symbols. In the Emergent framework, questions of mapping are inseparable from ques-
tions of conceptual representation. Therefore, the concept of mapping may be thought of as a
computational-level description (Marr, 1982) of a fundamentally integrated phenomenon, but
without direct implications for the algorithmic or implementation levels. On this view, the way
that concepts are stored and represented in the system (i.e. that they are interrelated or even over-
lapping) may naturally give rise to analogical mapping over the course of development (French,
1995; Hofstadter, 1996).
Previously, proponents of the Emergent approach have highlighted the importance of study-
ing the relationship between conceptual representation and relational reasoning. The Copycat
and Tabletop models of analogy proposed by Hofstadter, Mitchell, and French (French, 1995;
Hofstadter & Mitchell, 1994; Mitchell, 1993) describe relational reasoning as a type of generali-
sation that results from the blending of conceptual domains. Proponents of the Emergent approach
have also had success simulating certain aspects of the development of analogical reasoning (see
especially Leech et al., 2008).
Our work attempts to advance the Emergent framework by illustrating how a simple feed-
forward connectionist model can give rise to certain forms of analogical inference without recourse
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the deep connection between questions of conceptual representation and relational inference. But
unlike the Copycat model, our network learns conceptual representations through experience; in
the Copycat model, conceptual representations and connections between representations were not
learned. Further, unlike Copycat, which implemented conceptual representations as unitary nodes
with excitatory and inhibitory connections to related conceptual nodes, our network represents
conceptual knowledge in a truly sub-symbolic fashion, as distributed patterns of activation in
intermediate layers of the network. Our work also builds on the insights of Leech et al. (2008)
by focusing on knowledge-based analogical inference. A major criticism of Leech et al.’s (2008)
work has been its failure to capture our ability to use analogy to drive inferences and facilitate
knowledge acquisition (e.g. Markman & Laux, 2008; Opfer & Doumas, 2008).
In support of the Emergent approach, we use a computational framework that does not require
classical structured representations or an explicit mapping mechanism. The framework is based
on the Rumelhart model (Rumelhart, 1990; Rumelhart & Todd, 1993), used by Rogers and
McClelland (2004, 2008), to investigate the development and representation of general semantic
knowledge. In most of the simulations presented below, the network is given a partial phrase that
it tries to complete. At the outset, the model does not ‘know’ anything about the symbols that
constitute the phrase or how these symbols relate to one another. However, over the course of
training, the model learns to represent these inputs and outputs, and their relationships to one
another, in intermediate ‘hidden’ or ‘representation’ layers through an error-driven process of
progressive differentiation.
Importantly, although the inputs and outputs are presented as individual or combinations of
unitary nodes (symbols), the network is not symbolic in the traditional sense. The network does not
perform operations over the input, output, or relational symbols. Instead, the semantic information
is stored in the weights between the representation layers and, as we will see, relational reasoning
emerges from the overlapping, distributed representations that are learned in the hidden layers.
This modelling approach is consistent with an account of learning in which children (and adults)
are constantly making predictions about what they will experience in the world, and using their
observations (i.e. what they actually do experience) to make better predictions in the future (Elman,
1991; Rogers & McClelland, 2004). This model has succeeded in capturing many results from
the literature on semantic development in children (Rogers & McClelland, 2004, 2008), and we
have previously applied it to simulate the development of conceptual metaphor, which is closely
related to certain aspects of analogy (Flusberg, Thibodeau, Sternberg, & Glick, 2010; Thibodeau,
McClelland, & Boroditsky, 2009; see also the response to commentators in Rogers & McClelland,
2008, for an earlier attempt to showcase some of the analogy-like abilities of this model).
The importance of the research presented here depends on two key considerations: (1) that the
Rumelhart model is relevant to the discussion of the nature and structure of analogical reasoning
and (2) that the tasks we ask the model to perform are indeed relevant, appropriate analogical rea-
soning tasks. Consideration (1) is relatively uncontroversial because the Rumelhart model has been
explicitly (and implicitly) singled out as incapable of supporting analogical processing as a matter
of a priori fact by proponents of the Structural approach, as detailed above. Consideration (2) may
be a point of more contentious debate, an issue we turn to in greater depth in the general discussion.
We show that there are two key features of analogical reasoning that this model will come to
exhibit over the course of learning. First, we demonstrate that the model can make an inference
based on shared relational structure between a source and target domain in the face of conflicting
feature-based similarity, a hallmark of mature analogical reasoning (Gentner, 1983). Second, we
show that the model can leverage shared relational structure between two domains in order to
facilitate learning (Carey, 2009; Gentner, 2010a). We also review other aspects of the model’s
behaviour that parallel data on the development of analogical reasoning, including a shift over
time from making inferences based on shared surface features to inferences based on shared






























These findings leave proponents of the Structural approach to analogy with something of a
dilemma. One possibility is to conclude that the model is succeeding at these analogical reasoning
tasks by actually implementing processes like mapping, but doing so in an emergent, graded, and
approximate fashion rather than an explicit and rule-like fashion (see, e.g., Frank, Haselager, &
van Rooij, 2009; Monner & Reggia, 2012). This is our preferred interpretation, and we utilise the
concept of structured pattern completion to help explain the behaviour of the network (Gentner
& Markman, 1993, 1995). Indeed, the heart of this research project consists of exploring aspects
of the model that allow it to implement these analogical processes, including architectural and
learning-based constraints, as well as the important role language might play in the development
of analogical reasoning (McClelland, 2009, 2010).
Another possibility, alluded to above, is to conclude that the model is not doing analogy at all.
However, this option implies that some behaviours that have previously been claimed to require
analogical reasoning (e.g. drawing certain inferences based on shared relational structure) do
not actually require all the sub-components previously proposed and instead can be performed
in some other way. We thoroughly discuss the implications of both of these possibilities in the
general discussion. Either conclusion represents an advance in our understanding of the nature of
analogical reasoning.
A brief outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. We will first describe the general
structure of the Rumelhart model architecture and introduce our task: learning about two families
with alignable relational structure, each including parents, children, and a dog. After learning
about the two families, we ask the model to answer a particular question about one of the families
(‘Who walks the dog?’). Critically, this test does not involve any fact that the model was explicitly
trained on; the model can only resolve it by exploiting the relational similarity between the two
families. A series of simulations allows us to explore aspects of its learning and rule out various
alternative explanations for its performance. We then highlight the strengths and weaknesses of
this modelling approach, including what features of analogical reasoning this type of model can
simulate, and what behaviours might require additional cognitive machinery. We conclude with
a discussion of how the Emergent approach to analogy relates to existing theories and address
some of the long-standing critiques of the (in)ability of sub-symbolic models to learn relational
structure, along with the other issues raised above.
2. General modelling framework
Our learning task is inspired by Hinton’s (1986) family tree model, one of the first attempts to
address relational learning in a connectionist network. Previous empirical work has shown that
family trees are closely related to analogy, to the point that practice with family trees facilitates
analogical inference in young children (e.g. Mutafchieva & Kokinov, 2007). The goal of the model
is to learn ‘statements’ that are true about the various members of a family, including identity
information, perceptual features, and relations between family members. The input to the model
consists of activating a Subject unit, corresponding to a particular family member, and a Relation
unit. The Relation units correspond to the different kinds of relationships that can hold between
subjects and objects (e.g. ‘is_named’, ‘is_a’, ‘has’, ‘parent_of’, and ‘daughter_of’). The network
is wired up in a strictly feed-forward fashion, as shown in Figure 1, such that the input propagates
forward through the internal layers, resulting in a set of predictions over the Object layer. Over
the course of training, the network’s weights change (via backpropagation of the cross-entropy
error on the output units) in order to better predict which Objects hold for each particular Relation
to each Subject. As the model also contains intervening layers of units between the input and
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Figure 1. The network architecture. Note that in some cases more or fewer units were used in the Subject, Relation, or
Object layer to accommodate more or fewer families or family members.
Figure 2. An illustration of the Stripe and Solid families, which served as the source and target domain for most
simulations.
In this simple world, the network learns about two families: the Stripes and the Solids (pictured
in Figure 2 and described in Table 1). Each family has a mother, a father, a daughter, a son, and a pet






























In these training patterns there is no output overlap between the families. Specifically, there is one
unit that represents membership in the Stripe family and one that represents membership in the
Solid family. In addition, there is one output unit associated with each individual that represents
their name.
Each individual can be described as belonging to a variety of categories – for example, human,
dog, parent, child – given by the ‘is_a’ relation. In this context, corresponding family members
Table 1. Example set of training patterns with agent/subject (column 1), relation (column 2), and completion/object
(column 3).
MomStripe is−named Stripe, MomStripe
DadStripe is−named Stripe, DadStripe
DaughterStripe is−named Stripe, DaughterStripe
SonStripe is−named Stripe, SonStripe
DogStripe is−named Stripe, SogStripe
MomStripe is−a Stripe, human, adult, parent, mom
DadStripe is−a Stripe, human, adult, parent, dad
DaughterStripe is−a Stripe, human, child, daughter
SonStripe is−a Stripe, human, child, daughter
DogStripe is−a Stripe, dog
MomStripe has Grey hair, ponytail, brown eyes
DadStripe has a bald head, beard, brown eyes
DaughterStripe has blond hair, blue eyes
SonStripe has blond hair, glasses, brown eyes
DogStripe has blond hair, fur, brown eyes
MomStripe parent−of SonStripe, DaughterStripe
DadStripe parent−of SonStripe, DaughterStripe
DaughterStripe daughter−of MomStripe, DadStripe






MomSolid is−named Sollid, MomSolid
DadSolid is−named Solid, DadSolid
DaughterSolid is−named Solid, DaughterSolid
SonSolid is−named Solid, SonSolid
DogSolid is−named Solid, DogSolid
MomSolid is−a Solid, human, adult, parent, mom
DadSolid is−a Solid, human, adult, parent, dad
DaughterSolid is−a Solid, human, child, daughter
SonSolid is−a Solid, human, child, daughter
DogSolid is−a Solid, dog
MomSolid has Grey hair, green eyes
DadSolid has Grey hair, moustache, glasses, brown eyes
DaughterSolid has Brown hair, ponytail, green eyes
SonSolid has Brown hair, green eyes
DogSolid has Brown hair, fur, brown eyes
MomSolid parent−of SonSolid, DaughterSolid
DadSolid parent−of SonSolid, DaughterSolid
DaughterSolid daughter−of MomSolid, DadSolid





DogSolid walked−by ??? (DaughterSolid)
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Figure 3. The left panel displays a hierarchical cluster of the training patterns used for Simulation 3. The right panel
displays a correlation matrix of these same training patterns. The training patterns are structured such that any given member
of either family is most similar to another member of the same family. Additionally, despite mostly non-overlapping inputs
and outputs, the families are structured analogously.
in the two families share numerous features. For instance, the mother in the Stripe family and the
mother in the Solid family are both ‘human’, ‘parent’, ‘woman’, etc.
Each individual has a set of perceptual features, such as grey hair, a moustache, or glasses,
given by the ‘has’ relation. In this context, there is also feature overlap across families as well as
feature overlap within families. For instance, the mother in the Stripe family and the mother in
the Solid family both have grey hair, while the daughter in the Stripe family and the son in the
Stripe family both have blonde hair.
Finally, the members of each family sit in various relations to one another. For example, the
mother in the Stripe family is the ‘mother_of’ the son and daughter in the Stripe family. While
there is between-family overlap, across all training patterns in all contexts the similarity of each
person to all their family members is greater than to any non-family member (Figure 3).
Of note, this implementation of relations differentiates our Emergent approach from Structured
models of analogy like SME and LISA. In Structured models, relational and featural information
are treated as fundamentally different kinds of information: relations are operators over inter-
nal, feature-based representations (Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989; Hummel & Holyoak,
1997, 2003). In contrast, in our approach, the model’s learned representations of the input items
integrate these two types of information, treating relations as a fundamental part of the structure
of experience.
Both of these ways of thinking about and implementing relations may be important for ana-
logical reasoning, although they may underlie our thinking about different kinds of analogies.
Some analogies may require explicit mapping across domains – explicitly identifying relational
and featural correspondences in different domains (Holyoak, Novick, & Melz, 1994) – whereas
others may be more implicit and automatic. Implementing relations as part of experience may be
consistent with this latter class of analogies, which have received relatively less attention in the
analogy-modelling literature. We elaborate on this proposed distinction between different kinds
of analogies in the general discussion (but see Rogers & McClelland, 2004, 2008, for a more
detailed account of the advantages of treating relations as part of experience).
The underlying model parameters were identical in all the simulations that we present unless
otherwise indicated. The learning rate was 0.005 and the network was trained for 10,000 epochs.
Results were averaged over 10 runs of each network in order to provide data for statistical tests and
rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a random, unlikely configuration of network






























In all presented simulations, error on the training patterns was very low by the end of training
(average cross-entropy error <0.35).
3. Simulations
3.1. The basic model
In the first simulation, the network learns about the Stripes and the Solids, with a single fact
omitted about the Solid family. However, the families are otherwise very similar, with isomorphic
relational structures (i.e. they have the same family members in the same relationships to one
another). In particular, the daughter of the Stripes both owns the dog and walks the dog. While the
network knows that the daughter of the Solids owns their dog, it receives no information about
who walks their dog. This network does a good job of learning the facts on which it is trained,
but the question of interest is whether it can extend its knowledge to answer a question on which
it received no training: Who walks the Solids’ dog?
We can contrast two major predictions. Naively, one might think that the network runs on raw
association. As the Solids’ dog is most similar to the Stripes’ dog, the network should conclude
that the Stripes’ daughter walks the Solids’ dog! Alternatively, we might expect that the network
will encode the relational structure between the two families, and so will correctly conclude that
the person in the appropriate position within the Solid family – namely, the Solid’s daughter –
will be the one who walks their dog. In fact, the network decides that within the Solid family, the
daughter walks the dog. A paired t-test contrasting the activation levels of the Stripes’ daughter
with the Solids’ daughter is highly significant, t[9] = 7.75, p < .001 (Figure 4).
It might be the case that the network is not driven by the relational similarity between the two
families, but rather by some non-obvious feature of the input within the Solid family alone. For
example, perhaps the fact that the daughter owns the dog creates enough of an association that
the network would also conclude that she walks the dog, even without drawing any analogical
inferences from the Stripe family. To control for this, we ran a second simulation, in which the
model was trained only on the Solid family, with no information about the Stripe family. In this
network, the model does not conclude that the daughter walks the dog. Instead, it defaults to a
different kind of mapping on which it has also been trained: the identity mapping. Without any
Figure 4. Each of the three panels above displays activation levels for the target units in response to the inference pattern
over the course of learning. The left panel illustrates results from the first simulation when the daughter walks the dog in
both the Stripe and Solid families; the middle panel illustrates results from the second simulation when the model only
learns about the Solid family; and the right panel illustrates results from the third simulation when the son walks the dog
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further information, the network decides that the dog walks itself! A paired t-test shows that
activation of the Solids’ dog is greater than the Solids’ daughter, t[9] = 5.61, p < .001 (Figure 4).
Simulations 1 and 2 do not, however, distinguish another set of predictions. One possibility is
that the network has learned to align the two families with respect to their relational structure, but
only in an exact way. On this account, the model may have placed both mothers, both daughters,
and both dogs in exactly the same structure, perhaps a tree structure, with a dimension dividing
the families from each other, driven by the overall relational similarity between the families.
Another possibility is that the network learns to associate certain common features, such as the
features shared among the analogous members of each family, in order to drive its success on
the relational questions. On either of these views, the network should only be able to align the
structures between the two families when the correspondence is exact, or nearly so.
On the other hand, perhaps the network has learned the details of the family relations within each
family as well as across families. In this case, it could learn a regularity like ‘whoever owns the dog,
walks the dog’, which is driven neither by perfect, global structural alignment nor by associations
between surface features. This kind of relational generalisation is closely related to those tasks
that previous researchers have argued can only be done using a distinct mapping mechanism
operating over explicit symbols (Gentner & Markman, 1993, 1995; Holyoak & Hummel, 2000;
Hummel, 2010; Markman, 1999). Therefore, it would be a surprising and exciting finding if this
network were able to succeed in such an abstract relational mapping task.
In order to distinguish between these hypotheses, we ran a third simulation, very similar to the
first, except that in the Stripe family, the son, not the daughter, both owns and walks the dog. When
the network is informed that the daughter of the Solids owns the dog, but is not told who walks
it, what should the network conclude? If the network needs to align each member of each family
exactly, it should overlay the two dogs in the same place relative to each family and conclude
that the Solids’ son walks their dog. Similarly, if overall association of the dog to certain features
(perhaps those that the sons share) is driving learning, then the Solids’ son should again walk the
dog. However, if the network is learning the details of the relational structure, and in particular
the regularity between owning a dog and walking it, then the network should succeed in inferring
that the Solids’ daughter walks the dog.
This is precisely what occurs. Separate tests contrasting the activation level of the Solids’
daughter with the activation level of the Stripes’ son, t[9] = 2.58, p < .05, the activation level
of the Solids’ son, t[9] = 2.95, p < .05, and the dog, t[18] = 3.35, p < .01, are all significant
(Figure 4). This demonstrates that raw co-occurrence or other simple associative processes which
are often believed to underlie the performance of error-driven learning models (e.g. Hummel,
2010, in reply to Ramscar, Yarlett, Dye, Denny, & Thorpe, 2010) are not the key to learning in
this model. It is, however, interesting to notice that the Stripes’ son is the model’s choice early
in training, suggesting that the network first tends to make judgements predominately based on
surface similarity, but over time shifts towards judgements based on relational similarity. This
‘relational shift’ has been widely observed in the literature on the development of analogical
reasoning abilities (Gentner, 1988; Goswami, 1992; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). Intriguingly,
this pattern is observed throughout the various simulations presented in this paper.
3.2. Extending the model
We have presented a basic set of simulations showing that the model succeeds in performing
analogical inference from a family that is fully described (and learned) to one that is less fully
described. In the simulations below, we will extend the basic model in several directions, address-
ing possible objections to our claim that the model really is succeeding at analogical inference.






























Figure 5. The three panels above display activation levels for the target units for Simulations 4–6 over the course of
learning. The left panel illustrates results from the fourth simulation in which the family trees have relational structures
that are less readily alignable; the middle panel illustrates results from the fifth simulation in which the network takes
distributed input representations of the family members; and the right panel illustrates results from the sixth simulation
in which there are no overlapping output units.
walks the dog, and the task of the model is to infer that the daughter of the other family, who owns
the dog, also walks it.
3.2.1. Inexact match: Can the model align non-isomorphic structures?
In the previous simulations, each family had the same number of family members, sitting in the
same (or extremely similar) relationships to one another. We can investigate the extent to which
the network relies on perfectly overlaying the two families by making the family structures only
approximately match. In the fourth simulation, the Stripes have three children, two sons and a
daughter, and one of the sons again owns (and walks) their dog. The Solid family still has two
children, one son and one daughter, and their daughter owns the dog. The model continues to make
the inference that she probably walks the dog as well. A paired t-test contrasting the activation
levels of the Solids’ daughter with the Stripes’ son is highly significant, t[9] = 4.28, p < .01
(Figure 5). This demonstrates that the network can learn to draw inferences over structures that
are only partially alignable, which has been shown to be important for analogical reasoning in
previous work (such as Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989).
3.2.2. Distributed inputs: Does the model rely on implementing symbols?
We have claimed that the success of this network depends on its development of distributed, sub-
symbolic representations, with which it can integrate the perceptual and the relational information
about the family members within a high-dimensional representational space. Others might argue
instead that the network is simply implementing symbols and succeeds by performing some
syntax-like transformation on those symbols. Such an argument may point to the localist input
units that represent the family members.We argue that the localist inputs are a useful simplification,
but that focusing on them is a distraction, as the network can never directly exploit these localist
units. Instead, it is required to re-represent each item as a pattern of activation over a hidden layer,
as described above.
To make this point more clear, we ran a fifth simulation, which included distributed, rather than
localist, input representations for the family members. Following a model by Rogers and McClel-
land (2004), these were simply chosen to be the perceptual features of each family member. For
instance, whereas in the first four simulations the mother in the Stripes family was represented
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a collection of units (e.g. ‘grey hair’, ‘ponytail’, and ‘brown eyes’) that describe her physical
appearance. This should not assist the network in acquiring the relational structure; if anything,
it might appear to bias the network towards using surface-level perceptual features for gener-
alisation. Nevertheless, the network still infers that the owner of the dog walks it, transferring
from the Stripes’ son to the Solids’ daughter. A paired t-test contrasting the activation levels
of the Solids’ daughter with the Stripes’ son was statistically significant, t[9] = 6.05, p < .001
(Figure 5).
3.2.3. Non-overlapping inputs: Does the model require perceptual overlap?
On the other hand, one might argue that the architecture is biased in the opposite direction:
the more direct overlap between the two families at the feature level (i.e. the output layer), the
less work the model needs to do to align their structures. What if only the relational similarity
is available, as might be the case when constructing analogical mappings across very different
domains of knowledge? This kind of analogy may be critical for explaining how analogy can
subserve cognition and reasoning more generally (e.g. Gentner, 2010b).
To test this, we carried out a sixth simulation in which the training patterns for the two families
had completely non-overlapping output units. The network essentially had two copies of each
output property, so that each family’s target representations were totally distinct. To succeed in
generalising the relation between the two families, the network would need to align the structures
even in the absence of any surface-level similarity between the two families. And this is precisely
what it did. Again, when the network is told that, in the Stripe family, the son owns and walks
the dog, it concludes that for the Solids, the owner of the dog – the daughter – must also walk it,
as evidenced by a paired t-test contrasting the activation levels of the Solids’ daughter with the
Stripes’ son, t[9] = 3.58, p < .01 (Figure 5).
3.2.4. Scaling-up: Can the model make inferences when given more than two families?
It remains to be shown that the ability of the model to make analogies does not depend on it living
in a world with only two different structures. Is it able to extend its learning to multiple families?
To investigate this question, we ran two different simulations, similar to those above, with four
rather than two distinct families (adding the Dash family and the Dot family). In Simulation 7, a
different member of each family owns and walks their dog: the father of one family, the mother
of another, the son of the third, and, finally, the daughter of the target family. In Simulation 8, in
addition to this variability, two of the families have slightly different structures: one has only a
son, while the other has two sons and a daughter.
In both cases, the network infers that in the target family, the daughter must also walk the
dog. For Simulation 7, a within-subjects ANOVA using a planned contrast comparing the acti-
vation values of the Solids’ daughter with the Stripes’ son, the Dashes’ mother, and the Dots’
father (each dog walker in their respective family) was significant, F[1, 36] = 31.10, p < .001.
Paired t-tests contrasting the activation levels of Solids’ daughter with the dog walkers in
each of the other families, including the Solids’ son t[9] = 3.47, p < .01, the Dashes’ mother,
t[9] = 3.45, p < .01, and the Dots’ father, t[9] = 3.47, p < .01, were also significant (Figure 6).
For Simulation 8, a within-subjects ANOVA using a planned contrast comparing the same acti-
vation values in the families with greater variability was also significant, F[1, 36] = 42.40,
p < .001. Paired t-tests contrasting the activation levels of the Solids’ daughter with the dog
walkers in each of the other families, including the Solids’ son, t[9] = 7.39, p < .001, the































Figure 6. The left panel illustrates results from the seventh simulation in which there are four families, each with a
different family member walking the dog. The middle panel illustrates results from the eighth simulation in which there
are four families with relational structures that are less readily alignable. The right panel displays activation levels for the
target unit in the ninth simulation in which the ‘pet_of’ relation was removed and additional Objects were ‘owned’.
3.2.5. Does the network merely have the specific relations and features required to solve the
problems on which it is tested?
In each of the simulations that we have presented so far, a suite of relations and features has facil-
itated the analogical mapping. In every case, there is only one ‘owner_of’ relation that uniquely
links the dog in a given family to their owner (e.g. the Stripes’ son and the Stripes’ dog) and
only one ‘pet_of’ relation that similarly links the dog in a given family to their owner (e.g. the
Stripes’ son and the Stripes’ dog). It may be argued that the ‘walked_by’ relation simply mirrors
the behaviour of these two relations.
We are not entirely opposed to this interpretation of the model’s performance. Since the network
never experiences two relations at the same time, it can never learn to associate relations through
direct co-occurrence. Such mirroring, therefore, could be a result of extracting higher order con-
textual co-occurrence. As we pointed out in the introduction, this would be an interesting finding
that many have argued is beyond the capability of sub-symbolic learning models. However, in
order to rigorously test this possibility, the relational correspondences between the pet owners
and their pets would need to be more complex and nuanced. That is, if the model can only learn to
extract the relational correspondence between owning and walking a pet in situations where there
are multiple relations to support the mapping and none to potentially misdirect the mapping, then
the applicability of our approach would be extremely limited.
We ran a ninth simulation to explore more complex relational correspondences. In this sim-
ulation, we eliminated the ‘pet_of’ relation so the network was never given a family’s dog and
‘pet_of’as input. We also added several objects (a house, a car, toys, a doll, and a robot) that could
be ‘owned’along with the dog by various family members: moms and dads of every family owned
‘houses’ and ‘cars’, kids and dogs in every family owned ‘toys’, daughters owned ‘dolls’, and
sons owned ‘robots’. These training patterns were added and subtracted from those that were used
in the eighth simulation, in which there were four families, each with slightly different kinship
structures, and in which a different member owned and walked the dog in each family.
To test whether the network would still infer that the Solids’daughter walked the Solids’dog, we
ran a within-subjectsANOVA using a planned contrast comparing the activation values of each dog
walker in their respective family. The results of the ANOVA were significant, F[1, 36] = 16.66,
p < .001, as were paired t-tests contrasting the activation levels of the Solids’daughter with the dog
walkers in each of the other families, including the Solids’ son, t[9] = 2.50, p < .05, the Dashes’
mother, t[9] = 2.20, p = .05, and the Dots’ father t[9] = 2.50, p < .001 (Figure 6). This suggests
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3.2.6. Learning with structure: Can shared relational structure drive learning in this model?
In the simulations presented above, we have explored some of the conditions under which a
connectionist network can successfully perform analogical inference. By extending the learning
environment in a variety of ways, we have also tried to anticipate and address objections to the
specific claim that the network is performing analogical inference. Here, we explore whether the
model can use analogy to facilitate the learning process itself. Researchers have demonstrated
that people can leverage shared relational structure between domains to drive learning (e.g. Carey,
2009), and others have suggested that analogy plays a powerful, if not critical, role in cognitive
development more generally (Gentner, 2010a). Can our model learn about a new domain of
knowledge faster by relying on shared relational structure with a domain it already knows about?
Interestingly, this question also allows us to address a general critique that is commonly levelled
against connectionist models: that they take too long to learn (e.g. Hummel & Holyoak, 2003). It
has been argued that connectionist models are a poor representation of the human mind because
they take, in the extreme case, thousands of exposures to learn what a human can learn on a single
trial (Marcus, 2001). Indeed, in the simulations that we have already presented in this paper, the
models were trained for 10,000 epochs to learn simple facts like ‘the Stripes’ son is the son of
the Stripes’ mother and father’. In contrast, it is argued, no person needs to be told that a son
is the child of the son’s mother more than a few times before committing this fact to memory.
While this is certainly a relevant concern, we wish to point out a few reasons why this critique is,
in our view, misguided.
First, it is important to spell out our commitment to the complementary learning systems
approach – namely, the existence of distinct slow- and fast-learning systems in the human
brain (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995).3 There is ample behavioural, neurologi-
cal, and computational evidence that the brain comprised a slow-learning cortical system and a
fast-learning hippocampal system that function together in a complementary fashion to support
memory and cognition (e.g., Eichenbaum, 2000; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; O’Reilly & Rudy,
2001). Following this framework, it is best to view our model as implementing a slow-learning
system (McClelland & Rogers, 2003). Therefore, we do not view the fact that the network takes
hundreds (or thousands) of epochs of training to learn as a drawback in itself. We believe there
may be qualitatively different kinds of analogical inference and this slow-learning model may not
be as useful for thinking about some cases of analogical reasoning (such as analogies that involve
explicitly mapping the target and base domains, which may require working memory and cogni-
tive control abilities). However, we feel that other cases of analogical inference are likely to be
supported by this slow, developmental system, and understanding how this process emerges over
developmental time is one of the goals of this paper.We return to this issue in the general discussion.
Second, we do not equate an epoch of training in a model with an exposure to an experience
in real life. Instead, a single real-world experience likely results in multiple ‘passes’ through
hippocampal and cortical networks in the brain. The recurrent nature of biological networks
leads them to repeatedly cycle activation patterns (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; McClelland
& Goddard, 1996). On this view, even when a child exhibits something like ‘fast-mapping’,
seemingly acquiring new knowledge in one trial, it is unlikely that her brain does a single feed-
forward pass of activation and then re-wires itself to have encoded the new label. Rather, the new
experience may be cycled and re-cycled through her brain during the dozens of seconds between
exposure and test – with a learning algorithm getting hundreds of opportunities to impose some
synaptic adjustments.
Third, while we train the model for 10,000 epochs in each simulation, it does not take the model
10,000 epochs to begin making the correct inference. As Figures 4–7 illustrate, the model reliably































Figure 7. The left panel illustrates results from the 10th and 11th simulations in which knowledge was incorporated
into existing structure or into a network without existing knowledge. The right panel displays activation levels for the
target unit in the 12th simulation in which the model generalised to the target domain once it learned who walked the dog
in the source domain.
Fourth, it is important to note that the model has absolutely no prior experience with anything
at the outset of each simulation! It starts with a completely blank (and random) slate, other than
the basic architectural constraints it embodies. People, on the other hand, almost always have
relevant prior experience to build upon. One reason that people can easily associate a child with
a parent is that they have a stable conception of what it means to be a child and what it means to
be a parent. That is, learning to link a child to their parent involves integrating this new piece of
information into an existing knowledge structure. This also seems likely to be the case for a neural
network model. Here, we test this intuition about the network by exploring whether integrating
novel information into an existing knowledge structure speeds learning in a connectionist model.
In the tenth simulation, we ran a modified version of the second simulation, in which the
model was trained on the Solid family alone, with no information about the Stripe family and
no information about who walks the dog. In this case, the model learns about the various family
members and their relationships to one another until this aspect of the training environment is
stably represented in the network (i.e. for 5000 epochs of training). Then, with this structure in
place, the network is introduced to a novel fact about the family – that the Solids’ daughter walks
the dog.
Recall that when the network is trained on a single family and is not told who walks the dog,
it thinks that the dog walks itself. After 5000 epochs of training, given the ‘dog’ and ‘walked_by’
input units, the network activates the ‘dog’ output unit most strongly (mean activation = .515,
sd = .15) and the daughter unit only weakly (mean = .123, sd = .093).
On the 5001th epoch of training, we introduced the fact about the daughter walking the dog
and then recorded how many epochs it took for the network to correctly activate the ‘daughter’
unit to a threshold of .5 when presented with the ‘dog’ and ‘walked_by’ input units. We found
that, on average, it took 78 epochs (sd = 40.7) for the network to reliably learn that the Solids’
daughter walks the dog when it had prior experience to build upon. At this point, activation of the
‘dog’ output unit had fallen considerably (mean activation = .240, sd = .087).
To contrast the speed at which the network learns who walks the dog when there is pre-existing
structure about the family, we also ran an 11th simulation in which the target pattern was included
as a training pattern from the beginning. In this 11th simulation, it took, on average, 1318.1 epochs
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t[12.8] = 125.0, p < .001. The learning trajectory of this fact in the two simulations is plotted
in Figure 7. When the model is integrating the fact about who walks the dog into pre-existing
structure, it learns the fact more than 16 times faster than it does when starting from a blank slate.
Finally, we ran a 12th simulation to explore generalisation in this context. Here, we trained
the network on two families – the Stripes and the Solids – for 5000 epochs on all the training
patterns except those that specified who walks the dog in each family. On the 5001th epoch of
training, we introduced a single new pattern: that the Stripes’ daughter walks the Stripes’ dog.
We were interested in whether the model would generalise this information to its representation
of the Solids’ family. That is, would the shared relational structure between the domains cause
the network to change its mind about who walks the Solids’ dog in light of the information about
who walks the Stripes’ dog?
We found that it did! Activation of the Solids’ dog output unit was significantly higher after
10,000 epochs of training than it was after 5000 epochs of training, t[9] = 6.799, p < .0001
(Figure 7). These findings suggest that the model can leverage shared relational structure to speed
up learning and drive analogical inference.
3.3. Discussion
To summarise the results of the above simulations, we have demonstrated that analogical inference
can emerge from a domain-general, distributed connectionist model of semantic learning and
reasoning. Critically, this analogical inference (1) is driven by generalisation from a source domain
to a target domain; (2) relies on abstract relational structure, not surface-level similarities or direct
featural associations or co-occurrences; (3) parallels important features of the development of
analogy in children; (4) can operate over structures which only approximately match, or which
are only partially alignable; (5) exploits structural similarity even in the absence of explicit feature
overlap, allowing the possibility of cross-domain analogical inference in guiding learning; (6)
scales up to more complex training sets; and (7) can be learned (and is generalisable) relatively
quickly, suggesting that the model can leverage shared relational structure to facilitate learning.
How is it that a connectionist model that lacks symbolic representations and an explicit mapping
mechanism can succeed at this kind of analogical inference task? As we have demonstrated in
several variations of the model, it is not due to any direct co-occurrence of features. Neither is it
due to any kind of surface-level similarity between the items. In the extreme case, the two families
can share absolutely no output units, and the model will still draw on the appropriate relational
structure to make novel inferences. We argue that part of the answer involves the progressive
differentiation of its representations over the course of development. Initially, all the weights
are set to very small random values, so the network essentially treats every family member, and
every relation, as being the same. Over the course of training, the model learns to ‘pull apart’
those representations that must be differentiated in order to produce the right answers. However,
it only does so in response to erroneous predictions. One crucial constraint on this process that
our model embodies is a particular architectural design that forces inputs from each domain to
pass through the same sets of weights and hidden units. Any changes to the weights that influence
one representation will also tend to affect similar representations. This biases the network to
reuse as much representational structure as it can get away with. Alternative architectures that
do not enforce the same general constraints fail to capture these patterns of learning (Rogers &
McClelland, 2004).
In this particular network, the families share a great deal of structural similarity. If the family
members are represented as points in a high-dimensional space, which is one approximate charac-
terisation of the network’s hidden representations, then the members of each family sit in similar
positions relative to the other family (or families). That is, the father and mother in the Stripes






























Solids. An efficient representation of these similarities is to use one dimension to separate the
families from each other, and the remaining dimensions to capture the relational structures com-
mon to each family (indeed, another model that learns family trees settles on exactly this kind of
representation; Hinton, 1986).
This also applies to the network’s representation of the relations. At the outset, the network does
not ‘know’ that the relations ‘sister of’ and ‘brother of’ are more closely related than ‘sister of’
and ‘has’. The network comes to learn the similarity structure of the relations through experience,
aligning relations that are used in similar contexts (i.e. with similar Subjects and Objects).
As a result, the network’s representations of the families become aligned over the course of
training, because this allows the network to learn more efficiently (i.e. to reduce error more
quickly). The side effect of this representational overlap is that when the network learns a fact
about one family (e.g. one dog’s owner walks it), the representations of the members of the
other family (e.g. between that dog and its owner) get to come along for the ride. This is
not to say that the model is stuck with its first guess about the structure of the world. As we
indicated in the description of Simulation 3, and as is visible in other simulations as well, the
model undergoes a developmental shift from predominantly perceptual to predominantly rela-
tional inference when the environment warrants such a shift (a finding we discuss in more detail
below).
We can observe the process of progressive differentiation in this network by looking at a
clustering diagram and a correlation matrix across the Subject Representation layer at different
points in time for Simulation 3 (Figure 8). These are different ways of visualising how the model
perceives the similarity between items throughout the course of learning. Early in training, the
network groups items essentially at random, since the weights are initialised to very small random
values. Later in training, the network’s representations capture both the surface similarities and
the relational similarities between items (in contrast to the training patterns, depicted in Figure 3).
Progressive differentiation in semantic networks has been explored more extensively in previous
work (Flusberg et al., 2010; Rogers & McClelland, 2004, 2008).
Several proponents of the Structural approach to analogy have suggested that a defining fea-
ture of analogical reasoning is the ability to perform structured pattern completion (Gentner &
Markman, 1993, 1995), which refers to a process whereby ‘a partial representation of the target
is completed based on its structural similarity to the base’ (Gentner & Markman, 1995). This is
typically defined in contrast to simple pattern completion, which is ‘based on the vector similari-
ties of the current activation pattern to previously learned patterns’ (Gentner & Markman, 1993).
Emergent models are frequently criticised for only being able to perform simple pattern comple-
tion, which is unable to account for a great deal of sophisticated human behaviour (as we detailed
in the introduction; see also Gentner & Markman, 1995). As we have shown, however, our model
behaves in a way that is perfectly captured by the concept of structured pattern completion: it
draws inferences based on information from patterns that do not share strong (or, in some cases,
any) similarity in terms of raw vector overlap. Rather, the patterns that come to most strongly
influence the model’s inferences about novel inputs are those that share the most similar structural
relationships with the other training items.
It is important to clarify what aspects of the environment we believe are encoded in our train-
ing patterns. Many of these patterns, such as those representing the visual features of the family
members, might be thought of as arising from perception. However, others, particularly those
representing familial relations such as ‘mother_of’ and ‘owner_of’, are much more likely to be
encoded linguistically than visually. That is, part of our story is that learners hear language describ-
ing the people and things around them at the same time as they experience them perceptually, and
these different sources of information are integrated whenever (as we think is almost always the
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Figure 8. Each of the plots above illustrates the similarity structure of the learned Subject Representations in Simula-
tion 3. Hierarchical clusters are on the left and correlation matrices are on the right. Early in training (the upper panels),
the network does not group individuals by family or relation. Later in training, at 1300 epochs (the lower panels), the
network has aligned the families according to their relational similarity.
This is consistent with a great deal of empirical work demonstrating that relational language
facilitates analogical inference and helps drive the relational shift in analogical development
(Gentner, Simms, & Flusberg, 2009; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005; Rattermann & Gentner,
1998). It is also consistent with other research on how language affects semantic processing more
generally, both in experimental studies (Boroditsky, 2001; Fausey, Long, Inamori, & Boroditsky,
2010; Lupyan, Rakison, & McClelland, 2007) and computational models (Andrews, Vigliocco,
& Vinson, 2009; Dilkina, McClelland, & Boroditsky, 2007; Flusberg et al., 2010). This approach
views relational labels as another set of environmental regularities, serving the function of aug-
menting the statistical structure of the environment in ways that facilitate learning analogical
representations, rather than as explicitly symbolic representations in the brain.
One of the major advantages of this approach is that it allows us to address how analogy naturally
emerges over the course of development without having to posit additional, complex cognitive
machinery. The Rumelhart model and its descendants (Rogers & McClelland, 2004, 2008) have
been used to address a diverse set of findings in conceptual development that had previously
been thought to require more complex explanations based on explicitly structured representations
or innate, domain-specific constraints (e.g. Carey, 2009; Keil, 1992; Murphy & Medin, 1985).
These include basic-level effects in categorisation (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-
Braem, 1976) and illusory correlations of perceptual features in categorised objects (Gelman,
1990), among others. In a similar vein, our extension provides an alternative way of explaining
the shift that occurs as children begin to make use of relational information in making inferences
(Gentner & Ratterman, 1991). The classic, knowledge-based account of this shift suggests that






























language), they begin to use this structure to make inferences via a distinct mapping or alignment
process (Gentner, 1988; Gentner & Ratterman, 1991; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). We agree
with this account to the extent that in our model, the relational shift takes place as sensitivity to
relational information increases (as opposed to an innate bias towards using relational structure
that is initially dominated by perceptual information; cf. Goswami, 1992). However, our model
exhibits this shift without proposing explicitly structured knowledge and additional mechanisms
for mapping across these structures. This is a parsimonious account that is more easily integrated
with what we know about the ontogeny of complex cognitive systems (Elman et al., 1996; Spencer,
Thomas, & McClelland, 2009).
In addition, our approach is well suited to explain why children do not always generalise
based on relational similarity. When perceptual information, rather than relational information, is
more likely to yield correct inferences, people are more likely to rely on perceptual information
(Bulloch & Opfer, 2009). Our model simply learns what kind of information is most likely to
yield the best inferences and represents this knowledge in a way that supports generalisation. In
the simulations we present, relying on relational information yields the best predictions; however,
as others have shown (e.g. Rogers & McClelland, 2004), the Rumelhart model can also leverage
featural similarity. In this way, our model is well suited to explore context sensitivity in a way
that ‘mapping’ algorithms like SME and LISA are not.
4. General discussion
In this paper, we have grounded analogical reasoning in a sub-symbolic account of learning general
semantics in an attempt to provide an Emergent approach to analogical inference. This may seem
surprising, as analogical inference has been thought to require explicit symbolic representations
as well as a distinct mapping mechanism operating over those symbols (Gentner, 2010a; Gentner
& Markman, 1993, 1995; Holyoak & Hummel, 2000; Hummel, 2010; Markman, 1999). In this
general discussion, we would like to address several sources of tension between our research
program and the more dominant Structural approach to understanding the nature of analogy.
As we pointed out in the introduction, the persuasiveness of our claims depends in part on
whether the tasks we modelled should really be considered ‘analogical’. After all, if we have only
succeeded in capturing some generic associative learning task then we really have not made any
novel contributions to our understanding of the nature of analogy. However, there are several com-
pelling reasons for accepting the idea that our model is genuinely performing analogical inference.
We asked the model to make an inference about a pattern it was not trained on, and to succeed
at this task the model had to draw on information it had already learned about another family
that shared relational structure with the target family. Furthermore, it had to leverage this shared
relational structure in the face of shared surface feature similarity between the two families. This
ability to map a relation from one domain to another, sometimes called copying with substitution,
has been singled out by researchers as a hallmark of mature analogical reasoning (Gentner, 1983,
1989, 2003; Gentner & Markman, 1995; Holyoak et al., 1994; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003). As
we have already pointed out, this sort of behaviour is well captured by the concept of structured
pattern completion (Gentner & Markman 1993, 1995).
Furthermore, our task bears strong similarities to behavioural tasks used by other analogy
researchers, such as transitive inference tasks, problem analogies, and class-inclusion tasks. For
instance, transitive inference tasks require that people abstract over superficial similarities between
conceptual domains and, instead, focus on relational similarity (e.g. Brown, 1989; Gentner, 1989;
Gentner & Loewenstein, 2002; Gentner & Ratterman, 1991; Goswami, 1995; Goswami & Pauen,
2005; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998; for a connectionist account
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on many of the same underlying cognitive mechanisms as our own task. Indeed, previous work
has shown that young children show improvement in their ability to perform transitive inference
when they practice with family trees (Mutafchieva & Kokinov, 2007).
On the other hand, if analogical reasoning is defined not in terms of behaviour or task demands,
but rather as the subset of tasks that require explicit mapping over structured symbolic represen-
tations at the algorithmic level, then the natural conclusion is that whatever our model is doing
is not analogy. However, if this were the case, then previous studies that have made use of tasks
structurally similar to our own would likewise not count as studies of analogy (e.g. Brown, 1989;
Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). Moreover, it would no longer be theoretically useful to talk about
structured pattern completion as a unique or distinct property of analogical inference. Rather, it
would have to be seen as a more general property of cognitive systems that can be implemented
in a variety of formal frameworks. Therefore, even if the conclusion one wants to draw is that our
model is not performing analogical inference, this would still advance our understanding of the
very nature of analogy by shedding light on what tasks may or may not require true analogical
inference. We suggest, then, that even the most ardent proponents of the Structural approach can
gain new insights from the work presented here.
Clearly, our preferred interpretation is to conclude that the model is genuinely performing ana-
logical inference. In fact, we would go so far as to suggest that the model is actually implementing
mapping and other processes that have typically been carried out by specialised mechanisms,
but doing so in an emergent and approximate fashion. On this view, processes like mapping
may be thought of as a useful computational-level description (Marr, 1982) of a system that
carries out analogical reasoning (though it may not be the only possible description of such a
system; e.g. Leech et al., 2008). Therefore, we would agree that the optimal function or goal
of any analogy model might be to map relational structure between domains and to use this
structural alignment to guide inference. However, we do not think that this necessarily has any
direct implications for what sorts of algorithms are used to instantiate this function. Instead, in
the Emergent approach we separate these levels of description and explore the ways in which
lower level algorithmic mechanisms like error-driven learning can give rise to complex, organ-
ised behaviour over the course of development (see also Elman et al., 1996; Rogers & McClelland,
2004).
As we have alluded to already, there are several strengths of this approach. First, it offers a
parsimonious account of many behavioural findings because it does not require positing additional
complex cognitive machinery (Rogers & McClelland, 2004). The Rumelhart network and related
connectionist architectures have been shown to capture and help explain a variety of phenomena
– the developmental trajectory of semantic learning (e.g. Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Schapiro
& McClelland, 2009), peoples’ sensitivity to the structure of experience (e.g. Cohen, Dunbar,
& McClelland, 1990; Elman, 1990), and the degradation of semantic knowledge as a result of
semantic dementia (e.g. Dilkina, McClelland, & Plaut, 2008). We have extended the scope of
the Rumelhart network to simple relational reasoning without adding a mechanism to explicitly
map representations or bind roles and fillers – mechanisms at the heart of Structural models of
analogical reasoning.
Second, it allows us to naturally address the development of cognitive functioning and to link
this up with what we know about biological and neural development more generally (Elman et al.,
1996; Leech et al., 2008; Spencer, Thomas, & McClelland, 2009). In fact, Structural models of
analogy have been criticised for failing to account for how the mechanisms they instantiate could
possibly develop in the first place (Leech et al., 2008). The DORA model (Discovery of Relations
by Analogy) (Doumas et al., 2008) attempts to address this concern in the Structural framework.
However, we see several important differences between DORA and Emergent models, particu-
larly with respect to the mechanisms that are thought to be necessary for analogical reasoning.






























Discovering a relation and representing it in a form that can support relational thinking entail solving three problems.
First, there must be some basic featural invariants that remain constant across instances of the relation, and the
perceptual/cognitive system must be able to detect them. Second, the architecture must be able to isolate these
invariants from the other properties of the objects engaged in the relation to be learned. Third, it must be able to
predicate the relational properties – that is, represent them as explicit entities that can be bound to arbitrary, novel
arguments. (Doumas et al., 2008, p. 2)
As we argue throughout this paper, we disagree with this view of what relational reasoning entails.
Our model does not require the explicit (symbolic) representation of the arguments and does not
view relations as operators over these symbolic representations (see Leech et al., 2008, for related
additional concerns with DORA).
While some proponents of the Structural approach have argued that the algorithms supporting
analogical inference should directly reflect the computational description of mapping over explic-
itly structured representations (Doumas et al., 2008, Holyoak and Hummel, 2008; Hummel, 2011;
Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008; Marcus, 2001; Marcus & Keil, 2008; Opfer & Doumas, 2008; but cf.
Marr, 1982), in principle, it is not necessary for representations to be explicitly structured in order
to approximate processes like alignment and projection (Chalmers, French, & Hofstadter, 1992;
see also Frank et al., 2009; Monner & Reggia, 2012). Other researchers have repeatedly exhibited
emergent connectionist models that have compositional structure or that can perform comparable
tasks (Chalmers, 1990; Elman, 1990; Leech et al., 2008; Smolensky & Legendre, 2006). (For an
early theoretical discussion of this issue, see van Gelder, 1990.)
In our Emergent approach, relational reasoning is natural by-product of learned, distributed
representations. The use of distributed and graded representations more accurately reflects the
graded and quasi-regular nature of both the environment we live in and human behaviour in
general (Rogers & McClelland, 2008; Spivey, 2007). Even tasks that appear to require discrete
responses are often supported by more graded and dynamic cognitive mechanisms (Spivey, 2007).
Further, the principles that we have documented here have been shown to underlie recurrent
networks that are capable of learning more complex relationships (e.g. hierarchical role-filler
bindings; McClelland & Kawamoto, 1986; St. John & McClelland, 1990). As a result, we are
confident that our approach is capable of scaling up to even more complex and hierarchical
structures. For instance, a recurrent model would likely be able to learn that (a) John loves Mary,
Mary loves Bill, and John is jealous of Bill; (b) Sally loves Fred and Fred loves Tina; and, in turn,
to infer (c) Sally is jealous of Tina. However, as currently configured, our model is not capable of
representing this kind of hierarchical information. Nevertheless, we believe this kind of inference
to be within the scope of the Emergent framework and are eager to explore this hypothesis in
future work. Again, we wish to emphasise that this is ultimately an empirical question rather than
a logical one.
This is not to say that our approach can account for all human analogical reasoning. Far from
it! As we described in our final series of simulations, we have only attempted to capture the sort
of analogical inference that emerges as a result of a gradual learning process over the course of
development. This may include any task that requires making inferences based on shared relational
structure that has been stored in long-term memory, including phenomena like reasoning with
conceptual metaphors (Flusberg et al., 2010; Thibodeau et al., 2009). Other researchers have
captured additional aspects of analogical reasoning in theoretically related Emergent models. For
example, Leech et al. (2008) used a recurrent connectionist architecture to simulate analogical
reasoning in tasks that take the classic ‘A:B::C:D’ form. However, even the approach of Leech
et al. (2008) may not be able to represent some kinds of analogy problems, in which highly
structured knowledge is learned and leveraged for inference extremely quickly (see commentary
responses in Leech et al., 2008).
Many of the analogy tasks used in previous work, which models like SME and LISA can capture
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Gentner, 1997; Clement & Gentner, 1991; Markman & Gentner, 1997; Morrison et al., 2004). For
example, we would agree that some analogy tasks may rely on working memory and cognitive
control processes, as well as one-shot learning and episodic memory (e.g. Gick & Holyoak, 1980).
Though we have highlighted the fact that our model performs structured pattern completion, this is
not the only defining feature of analogy (Gentner & Markman, 1993, 1995). For instance, mature
analogical reasoning is highly flexible and allows for multiple interpretations of a single item in
different comparisons, as well as multiple interpretations of any given comparison (Gentner &
Markman, 1995). This sort of flexibility lies outside the scope of our particular model and the
task we set out to simulate, and it may in fact require additional, online cognitive capacities like
working memory (Morrison et al., 2004).
Moreover, some aspects of analogical reasoning may demand much richer linguistic abilities
than we implemented in our model. As noted above, we treat relational language as an envi-
ronmental cue, encoding a certain kind of statistical structure that is then used to shape semantic
representations. While this is one important role of language in analogical reasoning, it may not be
the only one; the ability to verbally re-describe a situation to oneself, for example, is an important
tool in many higher level reasoning tasks (Williams & Lombrozo, 2010).
Further, despite our best efforts to systematically vary the training and test conditions of the
model, the simplicity of the target domains may be interpreted as a drawback of our approach.
We see a trade-off between maximising external validity – the degree to which the model reflects
the truly complex structure of the real world – and accessibility – our primary goal of present-
ing as clearly as possible how a set of well-understood, domain-general, and neurally inspired
mechanisms can support high-level relational inference. Balancing these goals is a challenge,
particularly to theoretical modelling in cognitive science (McClelland, 2009).
In principle, we think that the model could build representations of more complex domains that
contain many more relations and features without losing the ability to extract relational structure
and leverage it in a flexible and powerful way. However, as the complexity of the source and
target domains (and other domains that may be irrelevant to the mapping) increases, the model
may have a more difficult time making some analogical inferences. We do not view this as a flaw
of the model though. People too have a difficult time solving problems by analogy and selecting
relations from memory. Gick and Holyoak (1980), for instance, found that only a very small
percentage of people solved a target problem spontaneously by analogy. Performance improved
when people were given a hint to use an analogy or primed with multiple source domains. Our
model is consistent with this idea, because in some sense it takes ‘activating’ a relation (i.e. giving
the model a hint) to get it to complete a relational inference. That is, our model offers one account
for why giving a hint is helpful for solving problems by analogy: it leads to a process of structured
pattern completion that helps to select the appropriate relation and solve the target problem.
We emphasise that this is only a first step in a process of using emergent models to help elucidate
the mechanisms that underlie analogical reasoning. In the future, we plan to build on the current
work by exploring when and how emergent models can abstract and leverage relational structure
in more complex domains, with more variability between the source and target structures, and
when these structures encode a greater number of relations.
In sum, these issues point to a possible heterogeneous view of analogy. While some forms of
analogical inference may naturally emerge over the course of development due to the operation
of low-level learning mechanisms, other forms of analogical reasoning may only be possible by
exercising additional processes like cognitive control and working memory. Therefore, we would
like to suggest that one major unsolved problem in the field is the integration of the kind of slow-
learning, semantic cognition model described in this paper with the online, structurally explicit
models already in place. The extensive and valuable work on models such as SME and LISA over
the past 20 years, no less than the connectionist models we have implemented, must be used to






























In this sense, we can draw an analogy between this debate and the past tense debate (McClelland
& Patterson, 2002a, 200b; Pinker & Ullman, 2002a, 2002b), in which competing mechanisms
were offered to explain how people generate past-tense inflections of verbs. One view, the words
and rules approach, was structural and appealed to a complimentary set of mechanisms – a lexicon
and a rule-governed syntactic system (Pinker & Ullman, 2002a, 2002b). The other, emergent view
appealed to a single, distributed system that was able to learn and leverage knowledge of clusters
of quasi-regular verbs (McClelland & Patterson, 2002a, 200b). As is the case here, the two models
of past-tense inflection are difficult to differentiate in behavioural experiments, have contrasting
strengths and weaknesses, and maintain supporters and detractors to this day. Nonetheless, the
debate itself was the impetus for a great deal of research that has only deepened our understanding
of language processing. Our hope is that the simulations and argument we have presented will
similarly encourage people to think critically about the mechanisms that support analogy and
motivate continued theoretical and empirical work on analogical reasoning.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that analogical mapping and inference can emerge over the course of development
in a distributed model based on a simple, domain-general learning mechanism. Beyond this, our
results suggest that analogy may indeed lie at the very core of cognition, but for reasons quite
different from those suggested by previous researchers. Our framework suggests that distributed
representations that support analogical inference may arise naturally, spontaneously, and perva-
sively throughout development wherever there is shared relational structure between domains in
the environment. On this account, which we have described in terms of structured pattern comple-
tion, our experience of any piece of the world may be vastly enriched by all our other analogically
relevant experiences. This could allow us to impute structure in novel domains even with minimal
exposure, to map higher order relationships learned through language onto both concrete and
abstract domains, and even to correlate the structure of language with the structure of the world
– in short, many of the very things that seem to make us smart.
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Notes
1. It should be noted that this is not the only way to sub-divide analogy. For example, Hall (1989) suggests that analogy
consists of Recognition, Elaboration, Evaluation & Transfer, and Consolidation. However, there is a great deal of
overlap between the ways in which different researchers conceive of these sub-processes (e.g. Elaboration is very
similar to Mapping).
2. For convenience, we often use labelled or even localist input and output units. We interpret these patterns as observed
states of the world, including linguistic and non-linguistic perceptual-motor experience, which are used both to pre-
dict future states and to provide corrective feedback to these predictions (Flusberg et al., 2010; Rogers & McClelland,
2008). The input and output patters can be viewed as symbolic. However, unlike traditional symbolic models of
cognition, our model does not perform operations over these symbols, but over the learned re-representations of
the symbols in the internal layers. What is important for the internal layers is the statistical structure encoded by
the entire set of input and output vectors.
3. It bears mentioning that an argument for the existence of slow- and fast-learning systems was not the only lesson
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the difficult problem of how new information could be integrated with previously learned information without
overwriting that previous information (i.e. catastrophic interference).
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